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Abstract. We propose a scenario of a multiservice network, based on pragmatic 
ideas of programmable networks. Active routers are capable of processing both 
active and legacy packets. This scenario is vulnerable to a Denial of Service at-
tack, which consists in inserting false legacy packets into active routers. We 
propose a mechanism for detecting the injection of fake legacy packets into ac-
tive routers. This mechanism consists in exchanging accounting information on 
the traffic between neighboring active routers. The exchange of accounting in-
formation must be carried out in a secure way using secure active packets. The 
proposed mechanism is sensitive to the loss of packets. To deal with this prob-
lem some improvements in the mechanism has been proposed. An important is-
sue is the procedure for discharging packets when an attack has been detected. 
We propose an easy and efficient mechanism that would be improved in future 
work.       
Keywords: Active Networks, Security, Denial of Service. 
1   Introduction 
Active and programmable networks [1] facilitate the provision of new dynamic ser-
vices, introducing programmability into some nodes. We propose the use of an active 
router based on the SARA1 platform [2] to build a pragmatic multiservice network.   
The users of the multiservice network can request services (e.g. caching, transcod-
ing of multimedia flow…) to improve the communications between the end system 
users and other end systems in the network. To offer a service, active routers execute 
some specific codes to process packets exchanged between end systems. The multis-
ervice network requires security services to guarantee that only authorized users can 
deploy services.  
                                                          
*
   This work has been funded by CICYT under project IMPROVISA (TSI2005-07384-C03). 
1
  SARA (Simple Active Router-Assistant Architecture) is a prototype of an active router 
developed under the GCAP IST project by the active networks researchers group of the Car-
los III University of Madrid. 
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Active routers are the critical point that must be protected. The active routers exe-
cute dynamic codes to process active packets carrying control information and legacy 
packets carrying data. The active packets must be authenticated to avoid fake active 
packets changing the behaviour of active routers. We have proposed a security solu-
tion to tackle these problems in [3]. Other problem can appear when fake legacy pack-
ets, which are also processed by active routers, are injected into active routers. A 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack occurs in active routers in this situation. In this paper 
we describe a solution to tackle this problem, which consists in exchanging account-
ing information between the neighbouring active routers. The insertion attacks can be 
detected at the attacked nodes by comparing the exchanged information. A reaction 
mechanism to use when an attack occurs is also defined.  
The rest of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe a proposal for the mul-
tiservice network, in section 3 the security problem in this scenario is presented, in 
section 4 we propose a mechanism to solve the problem, in section 5 some validation 
tests are presented, and finally section 6 is devoted to the conclusion and future work.    
2   A Pragmatic Vision of Multiservice Networks Based on 
     Programmable Networks 
The multiservice network that we propose is made up of a number of active routers 
within an IP network. The active routers identify special packets called active packets 
and load a specific code to process these active packets. Active packets go from an 
end system (source) to an end system (destination), and the active routers in the path 
between the source and the destination process the active packets (Figure 1) using a 
specific code.  
 
Fig. 1. Scenario of a multiservice network based on a programmable network 
In some programmable networks, users can introduce their own executable codes 
into the active routers, but this is not a pragmatic solution because of the risk of intro-
ducing malicious codes. So, in order to allow the network administrator to control the 
codes running in active nodes, we propose to use code servers. Every active packet  
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carries the code identifier, which identifies the code that the active routers must  
execute to process the active packet itself. When an active router receives an active 
packet, if it does not have the code to process it yet, it will download the code from a 
code server.  
Active routers consume resources when the multiservice network offers the ser-
vices demanded by the users. We will define a service model that forces the users to 
request a service before using it, so the multiservice network can accept or refuse the 
service according to the available resources. These services must be controlled in 
order to offer just the authorized services. So, active routers must only process the 
active packets that belong to an authorized service (e.g. transcodig service).  
There are some approaches towards a programmable network in which active 
routers need to know who their closest active routers are in order to send them the 
active packets, while in other approaches active routers that process active packets do 
not need to know this information (its IP address). In this case active packets are sent 
to the destination and intercepted by the active routers in the path. We suppose that in 
a generic scenario of programmable networks, the active routers do not need to know 
the topology (the other active routers). This supposition allows us to propose a generic 
security solution valid for both programmable network technology approaches. In 
addition, it is a pragmatic requirement that the end systems do not need to know the 
active routers (its IP address) in order to send them active packets.  
A programmable network could experience changes in topology which can be pro-
duced by changes in the network routes by new active routers that appear in the net-
work or when an active router is down. The changes in topology can cause the 
changes to take place suddenly, as new active routers start to process the active pack-
ets of a service, or that other active routers suspend the processing of active packets. 
The security architecture must be immune to changes of topology.  
It is assumed by the scientific community that the active routers will be located on 
the edge of the network, where a higher processing power to packet throughput ratio 
is possible. So, we consider that active routers will be located in the ISP networks that 
are on the edge of the Internet, which offer services directly to the users. 
We propose to use SARA [4, 5] as active router because it follows some of the 
aforementioned ideas: (1) SARA uses a code server to download codes executed by 
the active routers, in this way codes can be controlled by network providers. (2) The 
SARA architecture allows upgrading legacy high-speed routers to work as active 
routers by delegating active processing to an external entity called assistant. (3)  Ac-
tive packets sent by SARA, have set the router alert [6] IP option. These active pack-
ets are sent between two end systems (Source and Destination), using the traditional 
IP routing. The router alert option allows the active routers in the path to catch active 
packets, process them and finally queue them in the router output to follow the jour-
ney towards their destination. This avoids costly tunneling management. (4) Active 
routers can be configured dynamically to pick up legacy IP packets compliant with a 
predefined pattern. The configuration of the pattern is carried out via active packets 
acting as control packets. The pattern can be specified using fields within the packet 
headers (e.g. source and/or destination IP address, transport protocol, source and/or 
destination ports…). The set of packets that match a specific pattern are called a flow.  
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3   Security Problem  
Active routers must be protected against security attacks. An active router is more 
vulnerable than a legacy router because a active router processes external codes and 
active packets that may change its own behavior. The deployment of an active net-
work must be carried out by authorized users, so active packets sent by these users, 
which allow the programmable network to be configured, must be authorized and 
authenticated. An efficient security mechanism of authorization and authentication 
has to be used so as not to consume too many resources of active routers. Code exe-
cuted in active routers have to be downloaded securely from trusted code servers 
using services that guarantee authentication and confidentiality of codes.  
In [3] we propose a security architecture to protect programmable networks such as 
SARA from malicious active packets and codes. This security architecture allows 
users to obtain authorization to send active packets from a specific source to a desti-
nation. So a user is authorized to obtain a certain service by sending active packets. 
Active packets and code are protected using cryptography. 
Once active packets and code are protected, we focus attention on legacy packets, 
which are picked them up and processed by active routers. As we stated before, once 
a pattern has been configured, a predefined flow of legacy packets, which are sent 
from a source to a destination, are processed by the active routers in the path (e.g. by 
the transcoding service); we will call these legacy packets legitimate packets. A mali-
cious entity could generate fake legacy packets that fulfill the specified pattern. By 
injecting these fake legacy packets into the same path as the legitimate ones (see fig. 
1), the following active routers in the path will process them. So, these active routers 
use more resources than predicted. Hence, the injection of fake legacy packets can 
provoke a Denegation of Service (DoS) at active routers. We will call these fake leg-
acy packets inserted packets.  
The security goal here is to protect active routers. Cryptographic mechanisms 
could be used to identify the inserted packets, but we have rejected this option be-
cause the protection mechanism should be transparent to end systems applications. 
That is to say, legacy packets have to arrive to destination in a transparent way, even 
if the active router near the destination is down, the legacy-packet format must not be 
modified (e.g. introducing cryptographic information that the destination does not 
know how to process).   
The state of the art in insertion attack detection usually uses mechanisms based 
on the observation of traffic at a point in the network, and the detection of an  
abnormal model of traffic behavior [7, 8, 9]. These techniques usually have a cer-
tain probability of making an error in the detection because they are based on a 
probabilistic interpretation of the observation. In this paper we propose a coopera-
tive mechanism based on the observation of traffic at two points in the network. 
Furthermore, we use the programmable capability of the active routers to deploy 
this cooperative mechanism as a service. By using cooperative detection it is possi-
ble to obtain precise information in most cases, which allow us to reduce the risk of 
making an error in detection. 
 4   Protection Against Insertion of Packets 
4.1   The Basic Description of Detection 
The security mechanisms described in this section are for the detection of attacks 
based on the insertion of packets in a flow of legitimate packets that must be proc-
essed by active routers. This mechanism is applied to each segment of the network 
which is delimited by two active routers or by an end system with active application 
support and an active router. So, all the segments that make a path between the end 
systems can be protected.  
At the starting point of each protected segment, a Signalling Agent (SA) counts the 
outgoing packets that belong to the observed flow. At the end of the segment, a Moni-
toring Agent (MA) counts the incoming packets that belong to the same flow. The 
counter of the packets is sent in a Signalling Active Packet (SAP) from the SA to the 
MA, intercalated among the legitimate flow’s packets. So, the MA can verify whether 
the received counter is equal to the local counter at the moment of receiving the SAP. 
A SAP is sent with a certain cadence of legitimate packets. The SAPs carry the 
current counter of outgoing legitimate packets at the SA and the cadence to send an-
other SAP. The term cadence here refers to the number of packets that the SA has to 
count before generating the next SAP. If non-legitimate packets are sent during a 
period of time, a default SAP is sent with the counter at that moment, so a default 
SAP is sent at least at a predefined frequency. The counter or cadences that are car-
ried by the SAPs may be modified by a malicious entity trying to avoid the detection 
of an attack. So, to prevent it, signalling packets must been protected against modifi-
cation or fabrication. Because SAPs are active packets, protection of authentication 
and authorization mechanisms supported by the active network [3] are valid to protect 
signalling information. 
As an active router would be processing a lot of different flows of legitimate pack-
ets when an insertion attack is detected, the active router would prevent more packets 
from being processed than the previously predefined ones that belong to the attacked 
flow. So a procedure for discarding packets would be activated as a response against 
an insertion attack. The discarded packets must be selected from among the following 
packets that arrive at the active router and that belong to the attacked flow. In the 
discarding process, is not possible to identify the inserted packets, so any legacy 
packet (legitimate or inserted) could be selected to be discarded. When an attack is 
detected, because MA counter is bigger that SA counter, the MA counter is updated 
with the value of the SA counter.   
4.2   Reordering and Duplication and Loss of Packets 
Since within IP networks such as the Internet, packets can be reordered, duplicated or 
lost, we are now going to analyze the influence of these issues on the detection 
mechanism.   
We can see the flow of legacy packets as a sequence of sets of legacy packets, 
where a set of legacy packets is separated by two consecutive SAPs. Because the 
network can reorder legitimate legacy packets or SAP packets, reordered packets 
would change to the previous or following set. As well as reordering, duplications of 
 DoS Protection for a Pragmatic Multiservice Network  
packets can be provoked because of malfunctions in nodes. This will provoke a false 
detection of an insertion in the MA.   
Figure 2 shows that two legitimate packets of a set are delayed in the next set. In 
this case, the MA will detect that it lacks two packets when the second SAP arrives. 
Because the MA counter (CMA) is updated with the value of the SA counter (CSA), 
when the next incoming SAP arrives, the MA will detect that there are two extra 
packets in the following set, and a false detection occurs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Reordering of packets 
Tests carried out in [10] show that reordering and duplication rarely happens. So 
the probability of obtaining a false detection resulting from these events is low. How-
ever, to reduce the risk of false detections, we define an insertion threshold (IT) as  the 
difference between the MA’s counter (CMA) and the SA’s counter (CSA). So, if CMA - 
CSA is higher than IT, an insertion attack is detected. On the other hand, the insertion 
threshold would prevent legitimate packets from being discarded in the event of a 
small attack which does not mean a significant DoS problem for the active router.   
When a packet is reordered, the number of packets skipped in the reordering proc-
ess is usually small, 3 hops in 87% of reordering cases [11]. So, the minimum value 
of the insertion threshold should be small (3 or 4 are correct minimum values). 
The loss of packets happens at a greater frequency than duplication and reordering. 
The loss of a legacy packet does not mean a DoS problem for the destination active 
router. The MA in this active router calculates the difference between the local and 
the received counters, and because CMA – CSA is less than 0, no detection takes place. 
In this case CMA is updated with the CSA value. Even if an insertion attack compen-
sates the quantity of packets lost, this does not mean a problem because the active 
router will not process more packets than the ones predicted. 
A main problem happens when an SAP is lost. In this case, the MA does not re-
ceive the SAP at the expected time. The observation of this situation could be con-
fused with a strong attack in which the MA receives a lot of inserted packets mixed 
with legitimate packets. In this case, the MA could assume that a strong attack may be 
taking place and lot of packets has been intercalated between two consecutive SAPs. 
These two situations are illustrated in figure 3a. The left-hand illustration shows that 
two consecutive SAPs have been lost and the MA has counted 11 packets from the 
last SAP received. The right-hand illustration in figure 3a represents a strong attack in 
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 which no SAP has been sent because the SA has only counted 2 outgoing legitimate 
packets (in both situations we use a cadence of 5). In this case the MA has counted 11 
packets from the last SAP received, as there are 9 inserted packets. The MA cannot 
establish what has really happened until the next SAP arrives. So, in both situations 
the MA would assume the worst of the situations, which is a strong insertion attack. 
We will consider that a strong insertion is taking place when a defined number 
(e.g. 3) of consecutive SAP packets do not arrive when they are expected. When 
strong insertion is detected, the response mechanism must be aggressive in order to 
save the active router integrity. An example of an aggressive response consists in 
discarding all packets that belong to the attacked flow until an SAP arrives and con-
firms that the attack has finished. But on the other hand, if false detection has taken 
place (because 3 consecutive SAP’s were lost) an aggressive discarding takes place 
on the legitimate packets when no attack is really happening. 
To reduce the impact of the false detection of a strong insertion, a request for an 
SAP packet (RSAP) is sent by the MA to the SA, when an SAP has not arrived as 
expected. The MA should receive an SAP every time a quantity of packets equal to 
cadence plus the insertion threshold has arrived (IT), in the worst case. Every time this 
does not happen, an RSAP packet is sent to the SA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Fig. 3. Reaction against loss of packets 
When the SA receives the RSAP, it sends a new SAP with the current value of the 
counter. So, when a strong attack happens, the SAP packets are sent to the MA more 
frequently and the attacks are detected beforehand. Figure 3.b illustrates this proce-
dure in both situations, when a strong insertion attack happens and a false strong in-
sertion attack is detected. For simplicity, in figure 3b we have supposed that cadence 
is 5 and the insertion threshold is 0.  
We can see that when the MA has received 6 packets without an SAP, it sends the 
RSAP. In both cases (left and right), the SA sends an SAP in response to the RSAP 
received. When the new SAP arrives at the MA, it can be detected whether an attack  
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is taking place or not. The RSAP is an active packet as is the SAP so it has the same 
authentication and authorization mechanisms that are necessary to avoid unauthorised 
use.   
Summarizing the behaviour of the MA, two events can take place: 1) an SAP ar-
rives and an insertion attack is detected because CMA-CSA>IT or, 2) an SAP does not 
arrive when expected.  In this case, the MA activates the state of strong insertion 
attack and sends an RSAP. If the state of strong insertion attack is active, when an 
SAP arrives at the MA, the following could happen: 1) if CMA - CSA > IT an insertion 
attack will be detected, then the MA will change to insertion attack state, or 2) if CMA 
-CSA ≤ IT a loss of SAP is detected, then the MA will change to normal state. 
4.3   Discarding Procedure 
We have seen that the MA can produce two kinds of alarm: insertion attack and 
strong insertion attack. When an insertion attack happens, the MA knows how many 
packets have been inserted (CMA-CSA), so it can discard the same quantity of packets 
when the following packets arrive.   
When a strong insertion has been detected, the mechanism used to discard legacy 
packets must protect the active router from DoS, being the least aggressive as possible 
with legitimate packets. Discarding all legacy packets until being sure that the attack 
has finished is good for the active router interest but it is an aggressive method on 
legitimate packets. We have defined a less aggressive method based on memory, 
which consists in discarding all legacy packets in the strong insertion attack state, but 
when an SAP arrives, it takes into account the amount of discarded legacy packets 
and discounts it from the amount of legacy packets to be discarded (defined by CMA-
CSA). This method is fairer for legitimate packets but it has problems because it pro-
duces strong peak in traffic passing through the router (see figure 4).   
To find a solution to the peaks appearing in the method based on memory, we pro-
pose a discarding method based on a filter that consists of measuring the traffic rate 
when no attack happens. When a strong attack takes place, the MA discards all the 
packets to maintain the last measured traffic rate. We use a discrete low-pass filter to 
obtain an estimation of the traffic rate. Some tests have been carried out using differ-
ent filter coefficients to obtain a good behaviour for discarding when a strong attack 
takes place. The advantage of discrete filters is that they are easy to implement and 
the processing cost is low compared to the rest of MA process.  
5   Validation Tests 
Different tests have been carried out to validate the proposal. At first, the proposed 
mechanisms were simulated using the simulation tool ns-2 (Network Simulator v2), in 
order to analyze their behaviour in different situations, and then validate them. Then, 
an implementation was carried out in order to measure the resource consumption and 
to test its behaviour in a real scenario by tuning parameters as coefficients used for the 
discharging filter.  
The simulation scenario consists of two active routers and a malicious node located 
between both active routes in order to simulate the loss of packets and insertion  
attacks. A lot of simulations have been carried out by mixing different situations: 
different traffic models, different loss of packet levels, and different attack intensities. 
The results obtained demonstrate that the mechanism works well in different situa-
tions and provokes quite a few false detections, even if the percentage of lost packets 
is high (2 false detections in 10,000 seconds of observation with a loss of 20%). So 
the mechanism is resistant to the loss of packets.  
The second set of tests tries to verify whether the consumption of resources is 
proper and scalable. Mechanisms have been implemented for this proposal. The re-
quired time for MA and SA to process both the legitimate and SAP packets is 20% 
less than well-known and the most efficient cryptographic mechanism based on proc-
essing packets using HMAC-MD5. Furthermore, we have verified that the processing 
time increases linearly with the increase in the attack intensity, so the system scales 
properly.    
We have compared the discarding method behaviour using a filter with the discard-
ing method behaviour based on memory. The tests have been carried out on a real 
Internet scenario using two end points connected to the Internet. The legitimate pack-
ets follow a Pareto distribution using an ON/OFF period of 35/15ms and rate of 64 
Kbps. We have provoked attacks using CBR traffic of 64 Kbps for 600 seconds. The 
percentage of loss of packets that the network causes during the test was 6.8%.  
In both discarding methods, figure 4 shows the outgoing non-discarded traffic 
compared to the legitimate traffic coming into the MA, when an attack is taking place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Outgoing traffic compared to legitimate incoming traffic at the MA 
We can see that the non-discarded traffic in the case of discarding based on mem-
ory is less stable than the case of discarding based on filters, because a multiple peak 
of traffic appears that overtakes the incoming legitimate traffic. So, the method based 
on filters is more conservative to the active router interest, which is the main concern 
of the security mechanisms. Furthermore, we have seen that discarding based on fil-
ters is a little less aggressive to the legitimate traffic than the discarding method based 
on memory. Finally, the processing time when a packet arrives at the MA increases 
by 11.8% using filters rather than the memory-based method. We think that is a rea-
sonable cost. 
6   Conclusion and Future Work 
A model of a multiservice network based on programmable networks has been pro-
posed in this paper. The active routers must be protected against a DoS attack that 
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consists of the insertion of false legacy packets. We have proposed new mechanisms 
to tackle this problem based on the cooperation between active routers and using the 
capability of exchanging secure signaling information between active routers. We 
have carried out tests to validate the mechanisms, to verify the proper consumption of 
resources, and their scalability. We have proposed mechanisms to discard the packets 
in case of a strong attack. Finally we can conclude that the proposed mechanism 
against insertion attacks has a reasonable consumption of resources, and is pragmatic 
enough to be applied to the scenario described.  
For future work we are interested in identifying the legitimate packets in order to 
carry out a selective discarding. So we are working on marking the outgoing legiti-
mate packets at the SA, using hidden information in active packets to synchronize the 
SA and the MA.  
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